Abstract. Artificial Intelligence (AI) has long dealt with the issue of finding a suitable formalization for commonsense reasoning. Defeasible argumentation has proven to be a successful approach in many respects, proving to be a confluence point for many alternative logical frameworks. Different formalisms have been developed, most of them sharing the common notions of argument and warrant. In defeasible argumentation, an argument is a tentative (defeasible) proof for reaching a conclusion. An argument is warranted when it ultimately prevails over other conflicting arguments. In this context, defeasible consequence relationships for modelling argument and warrant as well as their logical properties have gained particular attention.
Introduction and Motivations
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has long dealt with the issue of finding a suitable formalization for commonsense reasoning. Defeasible argumentation has proven to be a successful approach in many respects, proving to be a confluence point for many alternative logical frameworks. Different argument-based formalisms have been developed, most of them sharing the common notions of argument and warrant. In defeasible argumentation, an argument is a tentative (defeasible) proof for reaching a conclusion. An argument is warranted when it ultimately prevails over other conflicting arguments. In this context, defeasible inference relationships for modelling argument and warrant as well as their logical properties have gained particular attention. 1 As highlighted in [35, 8] several common elements can be identified in such frameworks: an underlying logical language, the concept of argument, etc. However, these elements appear along with a number of particular features which make it difficult to compare such frameworks with each other from a logical viewpoint. In this context, the search for a general framework for defeasible argumentation in which such common elements could be abstracted away led to the development of of LDS ar [7] , an argumentation formalism based on the labelled deduction methodology [15] .
Labelled Deductive Systems (LDS) [15, 16] were developed as a rigorous but flexible methodology to formalize complex systems as logical frameworks with labelled deduction capabilities (e.g., temporal logics, database query languages and defeasible reasoning systems). In labelled deduction, the usual notion of formula is replaced by the notion of labelled formula, expressed as Label :f, where Label represents a label associated with the wff f. A labelling language L Label and knowledge-representation language L kr can be combined to provide an enriched object language, in which labels convey additional information also encoded at object-language level.
The application of Labelled Deductive Systems to the formal analysis of Defeasible Argumentation establishes a bridge from the logical perspective on deduction to the procedure-oriented construction of arguments. In that manner, LDS constitutes a formalism within the set of tools characterizing the Universal Logic approach [5] which offers ways of studying the mechanisms by which arguments are constructed and their validity is studied. The precise definitions of the basic elements in Argumentation obtained inside the LDS framework helps in the comparison of the different argumentative systems created in the last three decades thus bringing the possibility of finding commonalities and differences in such developments. With that aim, this article analyzes two non-monotonic inference operators C arg and C war intended for modelling argument construction and dialectical analysis (warrant), respectively. As a basis for such analysis we will use the LDS ar framework, a unifying approach to computational models of argument using Labelled Deductive Systems (LDS). In the context of this logical framework, we show how labels can be used to represent arguments as well as argument trees, facilitating the definition and study of consequence operators, whose associated logical properties are studied and contrasted with Sld-based Horn logic. We contend that this analysis provides useful comparison criteria that can be extended and applied to other argumentation frameworks.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces some fundamentals of Labelled Deductive Systems. Section 3 presents the main elements of the LDS ar framework [9] , along with a worked example. Section 4 presents an overview of the basic notions concerning consequence operators, non-monotonic inference and their properties. Section 5 introduces two non-monotonic inference operators C arg and C war , used for computing arguments and warranted conclusions in the context of the proposed framework. Logical properties that characterize the behavior of these operators are discussed and contrasted. Section 6 analyzes some relevant aspects of of defeasible argumentation that can be analyzed on the basis of the proposed framework. Section 7 discusses related work. Finally, Section 8 concludes and presents some research lines for future work.
Labelled Deductive Systems: Fundamentals
Logic has been traditionally perceived as the study of 'consequence relations' between sets of formulae. The complexity of real-world problems and the associated formalizations in different application areas (such as Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Science and Computer Science) have resulted in a plethora of new logical systems, created to give an account to the variety of reasonings required in such areas. This situation prompted the development of Universal Logic, 2 which is not a new logic but a general theory of logics, where logics are considered as mathematical structures [5] . General tools started being developed for a systematic study of this huge amount of new logics. In this context Dov Gabbay focused on the issue of how to formally define the differences existing among logics, (which involves characterizing a way of comparing them). According to Gabbay [15] , the answers to these considerations are to be found in metalevel considerations, which can be better identified by analyzing those aspects which are uniform in most logics (e.g., the structure of inference rules, rules for quantifiers, etc.).
To this end Gabbay developed Labelled Deductive Systems (LDS) [15] , a unifying framework for the study of logics and of their interactions. LDS aim to characterize a logical system by 'abstracting away' the common aspects mentioned before. As a first approximation, a labelled deductive system is a 3-uple (A, L, M ), where L is a logical language (including connectives and wffs), A is an algebra on labels (with given operations), and M is a discipline which indicates how to label formulas in the logic, given the algebra A of labels [15] . Such a discipline will be formulated using deduction rules. In order to characterize an LDS, a labelled language must be defined including wffs and labels. In such language labels can be seen as carriers of information which is not present in the wffs themselves.
Why are labels needed? In LDS labels will be used to store information of different sort of the one encoded in the predicate associated with it. There may exist different reasons for doing this: it can be the case that the information on the label is of a different nature or purpose than the one coded in the main predicate, and therefore it is more convenient to keep it as an annotation or label; or it may also be the case that the manipulation of this extra information is too complex, and so we want to keep it apart from the predicate associated with it. Instead of referring to a formula A, the name of declarative unit is generically used to refer to labelled formulae t : A. As Gabbay remarks (op. cit.), there may be many uses for a label t in such a declarative unit t : A. The value t might correspond to a confidence value in fuzzy logic (e.g., t could be a real number between 0 and 1), an indicator of the origin of the wff A (e.g., in a very complex database), or an annotation of the proof of A (e.g., t can include the set of assumptions that lead to believe A).
There are several additional constraints imposed on the way we use LDS. The main ones are the following: a) the only inference rules allowed are the traditional ones, modus ponens and some form of introduction rule (deduction theorem) for implication, for example; b) allowable modes of label propagation are fixed for all logics. They can be adjusted in agreed ways to obtain variations, but in general the format is the same. This also applies to quantifiers (the quantifier rules are the same for all logics); and c) Metalevel features are implemented via the labelling mechanism, which is the object language. Finally, whereas in traditional logical systems the consequence is defined using proof rules on formulas, in the LDS methodology the consequence is defined by using rules on both formulae and labels. Thus the traditional notion of consequence between formulae of the form A 1 , . . . , A n B is replaced by the notion of consequence between labelled formulae t 1 :A 1 ; t 2 :A 2 ; . . . ; t n :A n | ∼ s:B. Accordingly, we will have formal rules for manipulating labels and this will allow for more scope and detailed analysis when decomposing the various features of the consequence relation. The meta features can be reflected in the algebra or logic of the labels, and the object features in the rules of the formulas. An in-depth discussion on LDS is outside the scope of this paper, and for further details the reader is referred to [15, 16] .
Modelling Argumentation with LDS: the LDS ar Framework
Argumentation frameworks 3 are characterized by representing certain features of informal argumentation using a formal language, along with an inference mechanism. Although these frameworks differ in their aims and characterization, the notion of argument is quite similar, having a strong resemblance to the notion of proof in logic. In fact, the difference between arguments and logical proofs is more 'pragmatic' than 'syntactic' [26] .
Prakken & Vreeswijk [35] have defined a conceptual framework in which most argumentation systems can be characterized. This conceptual framework involves five elements, namely: a) an underlying logical language L; b) a concept of argument; c) a concept of conflict among arguments; d) a notion of defeat among arguments; e) a notion of acceptability of arguments according to a well-defined criterion.
We contend that the above elements can be embedded as different parts of an LDS-based framework for argumentation called LDS ar [9] , whose salient features will be summarized in this section. In our approach the underlying logical language L will be a labelled language L Arg = (L Labels ,L KR ), where L Labels is a labelling language (representing epistemic status of knowledge, as well as arguments and their interrelationships) and L KR represents object-level knowledge. Thus, the labelling language L Labels will encode different information features which correspond to the elements (a)-(e) in Prakken & Vreeswijk's conceptualization.
Usually L KR will be a distinguished subset of FOL (e.g., the language of Horn clauses or the language of extended logic programming), together with the symbol "∼" to denote strict negation [27] . For practical purposes, L KR will usually be restricted to rules and facts, in which the notion of contradictory information can be expressed in terms of complementary literals p and ∼p. We will also assume an underlying inference procedure associated with L KR (e.g., Sld derivation). Given a set P ⊆ Wffs(L KR ), and φ ∈ Wffs(L KR ), we will write that P φ to denote that φ follows from P via . If two complementary literals can be derived from P via we will say that P is contradictory, or just write P ⊥. Following [15] , labelled wffs in L Arg will be called declarative units, having the form Label:wff.
1. The empty set ∅, or any φ ∈ Wffs(L KR ). These labels are called epistemic labels.
A set Φ ⊆ Wffs(L KR
. This is a label called argument label.
Next we introduce the notion of argumentative theory, which will be a set of 'basic' declarative units (bdu's) in our labelled language L Arg . Such bdu's will be used to encode defeasible and non-defeasible information. Definition 3.2 (Argumentative Theory). A labelled formula φ:α ∈ Wffs(L) such that α ∈ Wffs(L KR ) and either (1) φ = ∅ or (2) φ = {α} will be called a basic declarative unit (bdu). Cases (1) and (2) correspond to representing non-defeasible and defeasible knowledge, resp. A finite set Γ = {φ 1 :α 1 , . . . φ k :α k } where every φ i :α i is a bdu will be called an argumentative theory. We will assume that the set Strict(Γ) = {∅:α i | ∅:α i ∈ Γ} is non-contradictory wrt .
Argument Construction
Given an argumentative theory Γ and a wff φ ∈ L KR , we will provide a labelled inference relationship "| ∼ Arg " to characterize the notion of argument. Our labelled inference relationship "| ∼ Arg " will be characterized by a number of suitable deduction rules Intro-NR, Intro-RE, Intro-∧ and Elim-←( Figure 1 ). Rules Intro-NR and Intro-RE allow the introduction of non-defeasible and defeasible information when constructing arguments. Rules Intro-∧ and Elim-← stand for introducing conjunction and applying modus ponens. Note that in the last three rules a 'consistency check' wrt is performed, in order to ensure that the label associated with the inferred formula does not allow the derivation of complementary literals. Note also that the label A associated with a formula A:α contains all defeasible information needed to conclude α from Γ. We will write Args(Γ) to denote the set of all possible arguments that can be obtained from Γ.
Attack among Arguments. Dialectical Analysis
Clearly, given an argumentative theory Γ there may exist conflicting arguments (e.g., A:α and B:α) emerging from it. We will assume that conflict (also counterargument or attack ) among arguments is captured using the notion of contradiction associated with the inference relationship used for argument construction. Note that our notion of conflict is intentionally generic, as different, more concrete formalizations are possible. Defeat among arguments involves a preference criterion among conflicting arguments. If Γ is an argumentative theory, a preference order is any partial order defined on the arguments in Args(Γ). Particular approaches in argumentation Intro-∧: Figure 1 . Inference rules for argument construction frameworks to characterizing defeat may differ: some argumentation frameworks will only consider attack relationships [13] , others will distinguish between rebutting and undercutting attacks [34] , etc. We will not delve into such differences here, but will rather focus on capturing the notion of dialectical analysis in terms of natural deduction rules. A usual approach involves computing (explicitly or implicitly) a so-called dialectical tree.
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A dialectical tree is a dialogue tree between two parties, proponent and opponent. Branches of the tree correspond to all possible dialogues or exchanges of arguments between these two parties, starting from the initial argument at issue (root node). A dialectical tree can be marked as an and-or tree according to the following procedure: nodes with no defeaters (leaves) are marked as U -nodes (undefeated nodes). Inner nodes are marked as D-nodes (defeated nodes) iff they have at least one U -node as a child, and as U -nodes iff they have every child marked as a D-node (as shown in Figure 3 ). In the case that the root node of the tree is finally marked as U -node, then the associated argument is said to be justified or warranted. 6 
Intro-1D:
A:α T * (A):α whenever A is minimal wrt set inclusion
Mark-ND: Figure 2 . Rules for dialectical analysis characterizing the infer-
given by the label; or (b) defeated (D) (resp. undefeated (U )) in such context. In LDS ar , the construction of dialectical trees is formalized in terms of an inference relationship | ∼ T given by the natural deduction rules shown in Figure 2 . Rule Intro-1D allows to generate a tree with a single argument. 7 Rule Intro-ND allows to expand a given tree T * by introducing new subtrees T *
It must be remarked that a special condition VSTree(A, T * i ), i = 1 . . . k checks that such subtrees are valid. Such checking involves several considerations, such as determining that the root of every T * i is a defeater for the root of T * , and no fallacious argumentation is present by appending any T * i as a subtree rooted in A [39] . An in-depth discussion of such fallacies is outside the scope of this paper, and details can be found elsewhere [9] . Rules Mark-Atom, Mark-1D and Mark-ND allow to 'mark' the nodes (arguments) in a dialectical tree as defeated or undefeated. Note that the rules propagate marking from the bottom of the tree up to the root node, according to the marking criterion discussed before. A labelled formula T U i (A, ...):α stands for an argument A:α which has been marked as Unode according to the arguments introduced in the subtrees associated with the dialectical label T i . If the dialectical label T i cannot be further "expanded" (see discussion below), then it corresponds to an exhaustive analysis for the argument associated with the root of that tree. This allows to formalize the notion of warrant within the LDS ar framework as follows. 
In fact, this approach to compute warrant resembles Pollock's original ideas of "ultimately justified belief" [33] . Note that Def. 3.6 forces the computation of the deductive closure under "| ∼ T " in order to determine whether a literal is warranted or not. Fortunately this is not necessarily the case, since warrants can be captured in terms of a precedence relation "< " between dialectical labels. Informally, we will write T < T' whenever T reflects a state in a dialogue which is previous to T' (in other words, T' stands for a dialogue which evolves from T by incorporating new arguments). A final label is a dialectical label that cannot be extended any further. In the next Subsection we will present a worked example which illustrates the main aspects of the LDS ar framework for representing knowledge and performing argumentative inference. Consider an intelligent agent involved in controlling an engine with three switches sw1, sw2, and sw3. These switches regulate different features of the engine, such as the pumping system, speed, etc. Suppose we have defeasible information about how this engine works.
• If the pump is clogged (pc), then the engine gets no fuel (∼f ).
• When sw1 is on, fuel is normally pumped properly (pf ).
• When fuel is pumped properly (pf ), fuel is usually ok (f ).
• When sw2 is on, oil is usually pumped (po).
• When oil is pumped (po), it usually works ok (o).
• When there is oil and fuel (o) ∧ (f ), usually the engine works ok (e).
• When there is fuel, oil, and heat (o) ∧ (f ) ∧ (h) then the engine is usually not ok (∼e).
• When there is heat (h), normally there are oil problems (∼o).
• When fuel is pumped (pf ) and speed is low (l), then there are reasons to believe that the pump is clogged (pc).
• When sw2 is on, usually speed is low (l).
• When sw3 is on, usually fuel is ok (f ).
Suppose we also know some particular facts: sw1, sw2, and sw3 are on, and there is heat (h). The knowledge of such an agent can be modeled by the argumentative theory Γ engine shown in Figure 4 . From the theory Γ engine , the argument A:e, with
can be inferred via | ∼ Arg by applying the inference rules Intro-NR twice (inferring sw1 and sw2), then Intro-RE twice (inferring pf ← sw1 and po ← sw2 ), then Intro-RE twice again to infer f ← pf and o ← po, and finally Intro-RE once again to infer e ← f , o. In a similar way, arguments B:∼f , C:∼l, D:f and E:∼e can be derived via | ∼ Arg , with
Note that the arguments B:∼f , and E:∼e, are counterarguments for the original argument A:e, whereas C:∼l and D:f are counterarguments for B:∼f . In each of these cases, these counterarguments are also defeaters according to the specificity preference criterion [40] . Assuming such defeat relationship among arguments, the following formulae can be inferred via | ∼ T :
Note that the formula obtained in step (7) has a final label associated with it, since it cannot be 'expanded' from previous formulae. Hence, following Def. 3.7, we can conclude that e is not warranted.
Non-monotonic Inference Relationships: Fundamentals
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In classical logic, inference rules allow us to determine whether a given wff γ follows via " " from a set Γ of wffs. In classical logic the " " relationship is a consequence relationship (satisfying idempotence, cut and monotonicity). As non-monotonic and defeasible logics evolved into a valid alternative to formalize commonsense reasoning, a similar concept was needed to capture consequence without demanding some of these requirements (e.g. monotonicity). This led to the definition of a more generic notion of inference, namely inference relationships. New properties were defined and gained interest in this setting. In this section we will introduce the definition of (non-monotonic) inference relationship, as well the definitions some distinguished properties that characterize them.
Inference Relationship. Pure Logical Properties Definition 4.1 (Inference Relationship | ∼ . Inference Operator C(Γ))
. Let Γ be a set of wffs in a language L and let γ be a wff in Γ. We will write Γ| ∼ γ if γ is a (non-monotonic) consequence of Γ. We define C(Γ) = {γ | Γ| ∼ γ}.
Given an inference relationship "| ∼ " and a set Γ of sentences, the following are called basic (or pure) properties associated with any inference operator C(Γ):
The intuitive meaning of inclusion and idempotence should be clear without further comments. The cut rule states that expanding the information in Γ by adding new propositions from C(Γ) does not result in new conclusions being obtained. Cautious monotonicity constitutes somehow the 'inverse' of cut: adding new lemmas does not decrease inference power, i.e. the set of conclusions that can be obtained from a given theory. Combining cut and cautious monotonicity we get cummulativity, which states that intermediate proofs (lemmas) can be used as part of other (more complex) proofs without affecting the soundness of their conclusions.
These properties are called pure, since they can be applied to any language L, and are abstractly defined for an arbitrary inference relationship "| ∼ ". Nevertheless, other properties which link classical inference with an arbitrary inference relationship can be stated. These properties will be discussed next. In what follows we will assume that T h stands for an operator that characterizes classical inference, whereas C corresponds to some (non-monotonic) inference relationship "| ∼ ".
Horn and Non-Horn Logical Properties
A common name for cataloging non-pure properties is the distinction between Horn properties and non-Horn properties. Horn properties have the form "from the presence of some particular inferences, the presence of some other inferences can be assured". Non-Horn properties, on the other hand, have the form "from the absence of some particular inferences, the absence of some other inferences can be assured". Next we summarize the most important non-pure properties:
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Horn Properties.
1. Supraclassicality:
Conjunction of Conclusions: If x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ C(A) then x ∧ y ∈ C(A).
Subclassical Cummulativity: If A ⊆ B ⊆ T h(A) then C(A) = C(B).
Left Absorption: T h(C(Γ)) = C(Γ).
Right Absorption: C(T h(Γ)) = C(Γ).
Non-Horn Properties.
Rationality of Negation
: if A| ∼ z then either A ∪ {x}| ∼ z or A ∪ {¬x}| ∼ z. 2. Disjunctive Rationality: if A ∪ {x ∨ y}| ∼ z then A ∪ {x}| ∼ z or A ∪ {y}| ∼ z. 3. Rational Monotonicity: if A| ∼ z then either A ∪ {x}| ∼ z or A| ∼ ¬x.
Capturing Argument Construction and Warrant in LDS ar
In this Section we will present two non-monotonic inference operators for LDS ar associated with computing arguments and warranted literals, respectively. As discussed in Section 3, these concepts are based on the two inference relationships | ∼ Arg and | ∼ T , characterized by the natural deduction rules shown in Figures 1 and 2 , respectively. Given an argumentative theory Γ, | ∼ Arg is associated with labelled formulas corresponding to those arguments which can be inferred from Γ, whereas | ∼ T allows to obtain labelled formulas T(A, . . .):α, where the label T(A, . . .) depicts the dialectial analysis carried out to determine the epistemic status of the literal α. In the case of | ∼ T , we are particularly interested in those labelled formulas corresponding to ultimately accepted (or warranted) literals, as characterized in Def. 3.6. How can we formalize the notion of theorem in the context of LDS ar ? In this respect, there is an important aspect to take into account: LDS ar is based on an extension of logic programming, where literals can be preceded by strong negation, and some pieces of information can be distinguished (labeled) as 'defeasible'. Consequently, the notion of theorem in such a logic programming setting will be more restricted than the one used in classical logic, as only literals can be obtained as conclusions derivable from a given logic program. This leads to consider a specialized consequence operator for our framework, oriented towards a logic programming setting [27] , where typically Sld resolution is used to model which literals follow from a given logic program. Formally: Definition 5.1 (Consequence Operator Th sld (Γ)). Given an argumentative theory Γ, we define Th sld (Γ) as the set of all possible empty arguments that can be obtained form Γ. Formally:
According to definition 5.1, 'classical' consequences from an argumentative theory Γ will be arguments whose argument label is the empty set (i.e., arguments that do not rely on any defeasible information). We want to compare this notion of derivation with respect to inference relationships | ∼ Arg and | ∼ T . We will define two suitable inference operators for capturing those arguments that can be derived from Γ, and those literals that can be warranted from it. Warranted conclusions will be represented in terms of of new facts in our labelled language L Labels . Definition 5.2 (Inference Operators C arg (Γ) and C war (Γ)). Given an argumentative theory Γ, we will define two non-monotonic inference operators C arg (Γ) and C war (Γ) as follows:
In what follows we will analyze the different logical properties discussed in Section 4 in the context of LDS ar .
Logical Properties of C arg
Inclusion does not hold in general for C arg , since not every piece of defeasible information can be used as part of an argument. However, it does hold for (nondefeasible) facts. Therefore we refer to it as restricted inclusion. 
. Let Γ be a theory. Clearly, C arg (Γ) will correspond to a set of arguments
Note that by definition of | ∼ Arg , there are only two inference rules that can be applied on the basis of C arg (Γ), namely Intro-NR and Intro-RE (as rule Intro-∧ does not derive an argument, and Elim-← requires having a formula Φ:β ← α ∈ C arg (Γ), which cannot be the case as β ← α is not a literal. Let us analzye the application of Intro-NR and Intro-RE, which correspond to axioms in the characterization of | ∼ Arg :
1. Intro-NR applications can only result in new empty arguments being introduced.
Hence, ∅:α1 ∈ C arg (C arg (Γ)) whenever ∅:α1 ∈ C arg (Γ) 2. Intro-RE applications can result in non-empty arguments Φ:α being introduced whenever Strict(Γ) ∪ Φ ⊥. Clearly, every argument A:α in C arg (Γ) satisfies this restriction. Consequently, those arguments A:α in C arg (Γ) will be also members in C arg (C arg (Γ)). The proof in the other direction (⇐) follows an analogous way of reasoning.
As the inference operator | ∼ Arg models the construction of defeasible arguments, monotonicity does not hold, as expected. Semi-monotonicity is an interesting property suggested by Makinson & Schlechta [30] for analyzing non-monotonic consequence relationships. It is satisfied if all defeasible consequences from a given theory are preserved when the theory is augmented with new defeasible information. Next we show that semimonotonicity holds for | ∼ Arg . Cummulativity holds for argument construction. The importance of this property will be discussed later in section 8.
Lemma 5.7 (Cummulativity).
14 Let Γ be an argumentative theory, and let α 1 and α 2 be literals in Wffs(L KR ). Then Γ| ∼ Arg A 1 :α 1 implies that
The property of supraclassicality needs also a particular characterization in LDS ar , as theorems are restricted to literals supported by empty arguments (as indicated in Def. 5.1). Therefore we refer to the restricted version of this property as Horn Supraclassicality.
Proposition 5.8 (Horn Supraclassicality). The operator C arg (Γ) satisfies Horn supraclassicality wrt Th sld , i.e. Th sld (Γ) ⊆ C arg (Γ).
Proof. Proof is direct from Definition 5.1. Every member in Th sld (Γ) is an empty argument, and as such it is a member in C arg (Γ). Therefore Th sld (Γ) ⊆ C arg (Γ).
Proposition 5.9 (Left-Logical Equivalence). The operator C arg (Γ) satisfies leftlogical equivalence (i.e., given the formulas α, β and γ such that α ←→ β (both are logically equivalent) if
Proof. Note that logical equivalence in LDS ar is restricted to rules and facts. From the definition 3.2 therefore α ←→ β iff both α and β correspond to the same fact (i.e. α = β = ∅:φ, or α = β = φ:φ, where φ is a fact) or both α and β correspond to logically equivalent rules. In a logic programming setting two rules P ← Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q k and P ← Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q k will be equivalent iff P and P are the same fact (P ≡ P ) and the set {Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q k } is equal to the set {Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q k } (i.e., rules differ just in a permutation of the literals present in the antecedent). If γ ∈ C arg (Γ ∪ {α}) (hypothesis), then there exists an argument γ which follows from C arg (Γ ∪ {α}) via a sequence of applications of natural deduction rules from | ∼ Arg . From the definition of Intro-∧ and Elim-← it is straightforward to see that if such a proof could be obtained from C arg (Γ ∪ {α}) and β is logically equivalent to α, then the same proof can be obtained from C arg (Γ ∪ {β}).
Note that the property of right weakening cannot be considered (in a strict sense) in LDS ar , since the deductive system associated with Th sld does not allow the application of the deduction theorem [6] . Therefore, wffs of the form "x ← y" cannot be derived via sld . On the other hand, conjunction of conclusions does not hold for argument construction (as shown in Proposition 5.11). Therefore we will provide an alternative, restricted version of Right weakening considering only clauses with only one literal in the antecedent. We call such a property Horn Right Weakening. Proof. Suppose A:y ∈ C arg (Γ). Clearly, Strict(Γ) sld ⊥ (otherwise it would not have been possible to infer A:y). However, x ← y ∈ Strict(Γ). Then applying rule Elim-← it holds that A:x can be derived from Γ, or equivalently A:x ∈ C arg (Γ).
Proposition 5.11 (Conjunction of Conclusions).
15 The operator C arg (Γ) does not satisfy conjunction of conclusions, i.e. if x ∈ C arg (Γ) and y ∈ C arg (Γ), then it does not hold that x ∧ y ∈ C arg (Γ). 
Proposition 5.19 (Monotonicity). The operator C war (Γ) does not satisfy monotonicity.
Proof. A counterexample suffices. Consider the example given in Prop 5.5. In that case, Γ| ∼ T T U ({p ← q}):p and p is warranted. However, in Γ ∪ {∅:∼p} there is no argument with conclusion p, and consequently p is not warranted.
In contrast with | ∼ Arg , semi-monotonicity does not hold for | ∼ T . The reason is the following: adding new defeasible information cannot invalidate existing arguments, but it can enable building new arguments that were not derivable before. Hence, dialectical relationships among arguments are different. Arguments that were warranted may therefore no longer keep that status. Formally: As in the case of | ∼ Arg , we will consider a restricted version of supraclassicality for analyzing | ∼ T . Note that right weakening cannot be considered wrt | ∼ T , since there is no way of warranting formulas of the form "x ← y". However, as in the case of | ∼ Arg , an alternative version can be provided. Proof. Suppose ∅:y ∈ C war (Γ). That means that there is an argument A:y that can be obtained from Γ such that y is warranted. But if A:y is an argument for y, and ∅:x ← y ∈ Γ, via Elim-← it can be inferred that A:x is also an argument for x (note that the consistency constraint associated with the Elim-← rule holds, as otherwise it would not have been possible to derive A:y). Besides, the possible defeaters for argument A:y are the same as those for A:x (as the set A of defeasible information involved is the same in both cases). Therefore if A:y is warranted, then A:x is also warrantd, and consequently ∅:x ∈ C war (Γ), as we wanted to prove. Proof. We can reason as in proposition 5.12. Let Γ be an argumentative theory, and assume Γ ⊆ Th sld (Γ). Note that Th sld (Γ) involves only labelled formulas with an empty label. Consequently, it holds that for any Φ:α ∈ Γ it is the case that Φ = ∅, and α is a literal. But if this is the case, the only applicable inference rule on Γ is Intro-NR, which correspond to an axiom schema. Necessarily it follows that Γ = Th sld (Γ), and consequently Γ = Γ, so that C war (Γ) = C war (Γ ), as we wanted to prove.
The C war operator satisfies left absorption, but not right absorption. This follows from the epistemic status assigned to warranted literals: if they are incorporated as new facts into a given theory, clearly they will be also derivable via Sld inference as in logic programming. The converse is not true, since not every warranted literal is derivable via Sld. Note: Column C denotes the kind of property (P=pure; H=Horn; N=non-Horn) Finally, note that the C war operator does not satisfy disjunctive rationality. The reasons are the same as those discussed for the C arg operator.
Logical Properties of C arg and C war : Discussion
As we have shown in this paper, LDS ar provides a useful framework for analyzing different logical properties of defeasible argumentation, providing a better understanding of how argument construction and warrant behave. Figure 5 provides a summary of the logical properties discussed before.
Let us next analyze the implications of some of the properties presented before in the context of | ∼ Arg . When formalizing argument construction (operator C arg ), restricted inclusion ensures that non-defeasible facts (labelled formulas of the form ∅:α, where α is a literal) can be ontologically understood as empty arguments. Cummulativity allows to keep any argument obtained from a theory Γ as an 'intermediate proof' (lemma) to be used in building more complex arguments. Horn supraclassicality indicates that every conclusion that follows via Sld can be considered as a special form of argument (namely, an empty argument), whereas Horn right weakening tells us that strong rules in LDS ar preserve the intuitive semantics of a Horn rule(the existence of a strong rule ∅:y ← x makes every argument A for x be also an argument for y). Finally, subclassical cummulativity indicates that two argumentative theories Γ and Γ whose information is a subset of those literals that can be derived via Sld from Γ (or Γ ) are equivalent when considering the arguments that can be obtained from them.
Computing warrant, on the other hand, can also be better understood in the light of some logical properties of C war . Restricted inclusion ensures that any non-defeasible fact in a theory Γ can be considered as warranted. Idempotence indicates that successive applications of C war on a the set S of warranted literals returns exactly the same set. This makes sense as the formalization of warrant is intended to capture the ultimate acceptance of a piece of information, given the defeasible information at hand. Consequently, once the process of computing warrant has been performed, no additional conclusions can be obtained by repeating applications of the inference rules provided by | ∼ T . From Horn supraclassicality it follows that every conclusion obtained via Sld is a particular case of warranted literal, whereas Horn right weakening indicates that non-defeasible rules behave as such in the meta-level (a strong rule ∅:y ← x ensures that every warrant A for a literal x is also a warrant for y).
From subclassical cummulativity it follows that two theories Γ and Γ , whose information is a subset of the conclusions that can be obtained from Γ (or Γ ) are equivalent when considering the set of literals that can be warranted from them. Finally, left absorption in C war wrt C arg indicates that once a set of warranted literals have been obtained, Sld derivation does not add any inferential power.
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In [28, 25, 29] five properties are considered as characterizing the core of socalled Cummulative Nonmonotonic Logics, namely Reflexivity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening, Cut and Cautious Monotonicity. As the authors put it in [25] , these are "rockbottom properties without which a system should not be considered a logical system". In particular, in [25] several families of cummulative logics were defined and characterized, starting by the C system, the weakest system in this family of cummulative logics satisfying the above properties. We will focus on the analysis of three particular systems which deserve particular attention, namely C (for cummulative), P (for preferential ), and CM (for cummulative monotonic). Clearly, a direct comparison with these families of cummulative logics is not straightforward, as we have seen that LDS ar involves two separate aspects: argument construction (which satisfies cummulativity) and warrant computation (which does not satisfy cummulativity). In our framework, the above properties do hold for the construction of arguments, but not for modelling the computation of warranted conclusions (e.g. cummulativity is not satisfied). This emphasizes the fact that warranted literals have a particular epistemic status which cannot be analyzed at the same representation level as the context provided by the original argumentative theory. The system P, which occupies a central position in the hierarchy of non-monotonic systems for preferential reasoning cannot be analyzed in our context, as this system assumes the existence of disjunction in the language of formulas (whereas our framework is restricted to rules and facts). Finally, the system CM (which is not comparable with the system P) is monotonic, differing thus from our approach for both the | ∼ Arg and | ∼ T inference relationships (as both of them are non-monotonic).
As stated previously, we have restricted the conventional version of Right Weakening to clauses in which the antecedent Y of the rule X ← Y is formed by only one literal. In the case that Y were formed by more than one literal (i.e. Y is a conjunction of literals φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . φ k ) and assuming that we consider Y to hold whenever every φ i holds, Right Weakening does not apply (neither for argument construction nor for warrant). This situation can be seen the counterexample used in the proof of Proposition 5.11 where there are arguments A 1 :p and A 2 :r and a rule ∅:∼w ← p, r . In that case there are arguments for r and for p (and both p and r are warranted), but there is no argument with conclusion ∼w (and hence ∼w is not warranted).
The Power of Labels for Modelling Argumentation
Labelled Deduction Systems offer a wide range of possibilities for formalizing different aspects of computational models of natural argument. Next we will focus on those which we consider to be particularly relevant (along with the ones presented in the previous sections), namely detecting fallacies, formalizing argumentation in social contexts, and weighing arguments in dialectical trees.
Detecting Fallacies
According to Hamblin, the classical definition of a fallacy is "an argument that appears to be valid, but is not" [20, p.12] . In more general terms, a fallacy is a general type of appeal (or category of argument) that resembles good reasoning, but some of their inference steps are not truth-preserving. 18 As pointed out in [41] , while we may say that an argument is "fallacious", or "commits a fallacy", the term "fallacy" does not refer to an argument, but to an error of some identifiable kind. All of the arguments that are guilty of committing that error may be said to be instances of that fallacy, so fallacies are strictly and classically considered to be types of arguments.
Detecting logical fallacies plays an important role in computational models of argument. In this context the most basic fallacy involves "circular reasoning", or repetition of arguments in a dialogue (as this leads to infinite branches in dialectical trees). Such situation is explicitly avoided in most formal approaches to defeasible argumentation (e.g., [17, 22] ) by imposing this as a constraint in the definition of argument trees. Other approaches (e.g., [17] ) consider avoiding those dialogue lines whenever conflict arises among arguments advanced by the proponent (resp. opponent) in a given dialogue line. In that context, the advanced argument provoking such conflict is considered fallacious. In other cases (such as [24] ), analogous situations are obtained as a by-product of the framework under certain constraints (e.g., when characterizing well-founded semantics using an argument-based approach to logic programming, all proponent arguments in an argument tree turn out to be non-conflictive).
In our approach to argumentation using LDS, constraints upon formation of dialogue lines are given by the special condition VSTree(A, T * i ), which takes into account if a given dialectical label T * i can be used as a sub-tree in a more complex dialectical label rooted in set A of wffs, corresponding to the main argument at issue. Cycle detection as well as ill-formed dialogue lines (as defined in [17] ) are captured by this condition VSTree. Formal results concerning which dialectical trees are valid in a given argumentative framework can also be better analyzed by different characterizations of this condition.
Formalizing Arguments in Social Contexts
LDS also provide a sound framework for modelling multiagent societies. As Gabbay points out [15, p.311 ], a label could be the name of a person (source) who put some proposition forward, along with some indicator of the reliability of that person as a source of data. In this context, LDS play a role in formalizing source-based arguments [45] , i.e. arguments whose evaluation depends not only on the structure of the inference used, but also on some assessment of the sources of the premises. Evaluation of source-based arguments is clearly important in the context of computational models of argumentation for multiagent systems. In a very interesting paper [46] Walton shows how LDS and multi-agent systems can be combined to evaluate argumentation that is source-based and depends on a credibility function. He also remarks that two of the most common forms of source-based arguments are appeal to expert opinion (or ad verecundiam argument) and personal attacks (or ad hominem argument). Although such types of argumentation have been acknowledged as informal fallacies, Walton states that both of them can be "quite reasonable in many cases", particularly in legal argumentation contexts. As Walton points out [46, p.66 ] "LDS is a big step forward in the evaluation of ad hominem and ad verecundiam arguments, because it enables us to base our evaluation of such arguments on a label indicating a comparative assessment of the source of the propositions that were put forward".
The LDS ar framework can be naturally extended to formalize Walton's proposal, keeping at the same time the expressivity to capture the information involved in the dialectical analysis performed by a single agent. The labelled language L Arg in LDS ar can in turn be labelled (e.g., with a label (Ag i , c i ) denoting an agent's name Ag i and some associated credibility degree c i ), defining a new labelling language L Ag . Thus a labelled formula in the new language (L Ag , L Arg ) could be as follows:
(john, 0.7):(T U i (A, . . .):α) denoting that agent john with a credibility degree of 0.7 has performed some dialectical analysis concluding that α is currently assumed as warranted belief, on the basis of a dialectical analysis stored in the label T U i (A, . . .). Suitable deduction rules could be defined in order to characterize conflicts among several agents in which their credibility could be a factor to consider in assessing the final outcome of a dialogue among them.
In [1] it was underscored the importance of having a formal model of interagent dialogues for argument exchange by providing a precisely defined protocol for interaction. In [36] it was also emphasized that an important challenge facing future research is the understanding of 'social' aspects of argument-based negotiation in agent societies, as "there is still no generic formal theory that establishes a precise relationship between normative social behavior and the outcomes of communication processes." Given its expressive power, we think that LDS could provide an adequate formal tool in the context of formalizing protocols and norm adoption, helping to achieve the above goals.
Pruning and Weighing Arguments in Dialectical Trees
Dialectical trees provide a way of exhaustively analyzing arguments and counterarguments. A problem with this setting is that dialectical trees can often be "too big" [22] so that the use of some kind of pruning strategy is in order. There are several approaches to pruning the search space in dialectical trees. The most basic approach consists in applying α − β pruning, as illustrated in Figure 3 . When analyzing a given argument, instead of computing all possible defeaters ( ) only a part of the dialectical tree needs to be explored in order to determine whether the root node (main argument at issue) is defeated or not. It must be noted that the rules that characterize the "| ∼ T " relationship ( Figure 2 ) are also based on this strategy, used when propagating marking in labels in a bottom-up fashion.
Recent research [22] has been focused on analyzing the impact of argumentation. Such an impact depends on what an agent regards as important, which allows to characterize the resonance and cost of producing arguments and argument trees. To measure resonance in argument trees, the sum of the resonance of the arguments in the tree is taken into account, scaled by a discount function which increases going down the tree, so that arguments at a greater depth have a reduced net effect on the resonance of the tree. The first ideas underlying this approach can be found in [3] , where the notion of categoriser is introduced. A categoriser is a mapping from dialectical trees to numbers. The resulting number is intended to capture the relative strength of an argument taking into account its defeaters, the defeaters for those defeaters, and so on. An example of categoriser provided in [3] is the following:
where N 1 , . . . , N l are the children nodes for
In the context of LDS ar , assessing a weight to an argument on the basis of its defeaters can be performed in a natural way by suitably extending the criteria for labelling propagation. A function f could be defined to assign numbers to dialectical labels according to some particular criterion. Given a dialectical label, if A corresponds to an argument without defeaters it would be assigned a particular value f (A). Otherwise, if A is the root node in a dialectical tree with label T (A, T 1 , . . . , T k ), having as defeaters arguments B 1 . . . , B k , then f could be recursively defined as f (A)=f (f (T 1 ), ...f (T k )) where T 1 , . . . , T k are the immediate subtrees (dialectical labels) associated with T. In other words, numbers assigned to dialectical labels would be propagated bottom-up. Computing f can be thus defined in several ways (e.g., as suggested in [3] ). Such a setting allows to model a number of typical problems in defeasible argumentation, such as the the notion of accrual of arguments [44, 42] , where arguments with many defeaters would be deemed weaker as those which have only one defeater.
Related Work
Research in logical properties for defeasible argumentation was started by G.Vreeswijk [43] and H.Prakken [35] . In particular, the work of S. Sardiña [38] focused on logical properties of the original Simari-Loui framework [40] and of defeasible logic programming [17] . This research is partly motivated by these results.
Early work which used some of the principles present in LDS (but not as formally) was Cohen's theory of endorsements [12] . Endorsements are symbolic representations of different items of evidence, the questions on which they bear, and the relations between them. Endorsements can operate on each other and hence lead to the retraction of conclusions previously reached. Research concerning aggregating arguments by incorporating numerical and symbolic features can be traced back to the work of Krause et al. [14, 26] , where a uniform framework for reasoning with different kinds of strength in arguments is described. In particular, a characterization of defeasible reasoning using LDS is due to Hunter [21] , who showed how different non-monotonic logics can be characterized in terms of labelling strategies, algebras for labels, proof rules, and preference criteria. In contrast with our approach, Hunter had as a key aim to analyze the notion of preference among different non-monotonic logics. His approach, however, is also argument-based. In [31] a credulous logical system based on LDS is defined, partially based on cummulative default logics. In some respects this approach is related to the one presented in this paper, although does not aim at modelling argumentative reasoning as in our proposal.
Multicontext systems [18] have also been proposed as an alternative framework to LDS to provide contextual reasoning for agents. A context is a triple C = L, ω, ∆ , where L is a language (e.g., first order logic), ω is the set of axioms for the context and ∆ is the set of inference rules associated with the context C. A multicontext system is a pair C, B , where C = {c 1 , . . . , c n } is the set of all contexts, and B is the set of bridge rules which have the form c 1 : φ 1 . . . , c k : φ k → c i : φ i standing for "if the wffs φ 1 . . . , φ k are known to hold in contexts c 1 . . . , c k , then the wff φ i will hold in context c i . In [32] a multicontext approach to modelling argumentation among agents is presented. Different contexts represent different components in the agent architecture, and interactions between such components is specified by means of bridge rules between contexts. In [19] an interesting approach to modelling rhetorical argument is presented, in which mental states in an arguer are characterized as a multicontext system B, R , where B is a set of attitude contexts and R is a set of bridge rules among them. We contend that similar approaches to the ones mentioned above can be achieved in terms of the logical machinery provided by LDS. It must be noted that contexts themselves can be recast as elements in the labelling language. Thus, the context notation B A : X suggested in [19] to denote "agent A believes X" can be seen as a labelled sentence, with B A as associated label. Nesting beliefs is also possible in the LDS ontology, as suitable functors of the form B A (B B ) could be defined in the labelling language to denote situations like "agent A believes that agent B believes that...", which in [19] are defined by nesting contexts.
Conclusions and Future Work
LDS offer a powerful tool for formalizing different aspects of computational models of argument. In particular, as we have outlined in this paper, LDS ar provides a sound formal framework for modelling argument-based dialectical reasoning. The underlying argumentative logic can be formally analyzed from the natural deduction rules that characterize it, providing a way of studying formal properties associated with such logics. We think that a formal analysis of defeasible consequence is mandatory in order to get an in-depth understanding of the behavior of argumentation frameworks. The logical properties discussed in this paper provide a natural tool for characterizing that behavior, as well as useful comparison criteria when developing new argumentation frameworks, or assessing their expressive power.
We also showed that such framework can be parametrized with respect to a number of features (knowledge representation language, preconditions in natural deduction rules, etc.) which are unified in a single logical system. We have also shown why labels are a good alternative for coping with several issues relevant in modelling argumentation: detecting fallacies, considering arguments in social contexts, analyzing dialectical trees, and formalizing consequence operators.
We contend that several other issues related to computational models of natural argument which have not been explored in this article (e.g., argumentation protocols, resource-bounded reasoning, rhetorical capabilities, etc.) can be suitably modelled in terms of LDS by providing an appropriate ontology in which such notions can be 'abstracted away' as labels. We think that labels are also a good tool in the context of Semantic Web applications, as they can be naturally stored as pieces of structured XML code. On the other hand, the semantic annotation of web content may be stored as labels by means of an appropriate LDS. Different levels of granularity can also be better identified (e.g., abstracting away particular sublabels), which might be useful for identifying argumentation schemes [47] as well as for integrating LDS-based knowledge into salient software tools for argument analysis (such as Araucaria [37] ). In our opinion, exploiting such integration can offer promising results that can help in solving several open problems in making formal models of argument computationally attractive. Research in this direction is currently being pursued.
